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ABSTRACT
Recently, U.S. and international regulators have proposed significant changes to auditor
and audit committee reporting with the stated intention of delivering more useful information to
stakeholders. Whether new disclosure requirements achieve this intended benefit, however, is
unknown. Exploiting the exogenous shock of the recent changes to auditor and audit committee
reports in the United Kingdom, I find that information asymmetry significantly decreased
following the implementation of the new disclosure regime. Furthermore, I find that reductions
in information asymmetry are greater for firms with weaker information environments,
suggesting that the new disclosure requirements particularly benefit investors in these firms.
Additionally, I find some evidence that companies employing auditors that tend to provide more
(less) detailed audit reports under the new regime experience more (less) significant reductions
in information asymmetry. Overall, it appears that additional required disclosures from audit
committees and auditors provide new and useful information to investors and serve to reduce
information asymmetry. The results of this study provide important information to regulators,
auditors, audit committees, public companies, and capital markets worldwide.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The external auditor plays a critical role in the capital markets by monitoring
management and protecting shareholders’ interests through an independent attestation of a public
company’s financial statements. As an additional monitoring mechanism, the audit committee
oversees the financial reporting process, including the appointment and performance of the
external auditor. Despite the important functions of both the auditor and the audit committee, the
only communication they provide to investors, regulators, and other stakeholders are
standardized reports. In the United States and many other countries, the audit report follows a
“pass/fail” model that varies little between companies and offers minimal insight into the audit
process. Similarly, the audit committee report is typically boilerplate and presents limited
information on the committee’s oversight of the external auditor.
Many stakeholders have expressed concern that the current reports provide little
informational value and desire a revision to existing standards (Blake et al. 2011; Turner et al.
2010). In response to these concerns, regulators worldwide have taken action to improve the
transparency of the audit report as well as the audit committee report (IAASB 2013b; Cohn
2014). Of particular interest to this study, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) issued a proposed rule on August 13, 2013 that would require a discussion of critical
audit matters (“CAMs”), auditor independence, and tenure in the auditor report (PCAOB 2013).
Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plans to issue a concept release in
early 2015 with the aim of enhancing the work of audit committees and more specifically,
improving the audit committee report to make it more useful to investors (White 2014; Heller
2014; Whitehouse 2014). The effects of these reporting changes, however, are unknown ex-ante.
Proponents believe that enhancing the audit report and the audit committee report will deliver
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new and useful information to investors by providing insights into the valuable perspective that
these external monitors have on companies and increasing investors’ trust in the work performed
by auditors and audit committees (Buller 2013; IAASB 2013a; Melvin 2013; Touche 2014).
Opponents, however, argue that revising reporting requirements will be fruitless as additional
information will provide little, if any, incremental value to stakeholders given that investors may
find the disclosures unnecessary, uninteresting, or too daunting to process in their trading
decisions (Cardiff 2013; Cates 2013; Goff 2013). While some researchers have conducted
experiments, focus groups, and interviews to gain insight into potential avenues for report
improvements (Gray et al. 2011; Vanstraelen et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2014; Kachelmeier et
al. 2014), the lack of actual regulatory change has been a major limitation in the examination of
the effects of these reforms on financial statement users.
As former Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Chairman Dennis Beresford
stated in his comment letter to the PCAOB, “once you have real world examples…then, it should
be imperative to test how users would react to those disclosures and see if they would actually
find them beneficial” (Beresford 2013). This study uses the “real world examples” provided by
the United Kingdom’s reporting changes to examine the impact of additional disclosures on
financial statement users. Specifically, I examine the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC)
issuance of changes to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, its Guidance for Audit
Committees, and the International Standards on Auditing (U.K. and Ireland). The regulatory
changes, which became effective for financial statement years beginning on or after October 1,
2012, stipulate that audit committees must include in their report, among other disclosures, the
significant financial statement issues that the committee considered and how they addressed
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these issues (FRC 2012b).1 Additionally, the FRC’s revisions to the International Standard on
Auditing 700 (U.K. and Ireland) instruct auditors to include the following important items in
their reports: (1) a discussion of assessed risks of material misstatement, (2) information on the
materiality threshold applied in the engagement, and (3) a description of the scope of the audit
(FRC 2013).
In this study, I empirically examine whether new audit committee and auditor reporting
requirements fulfill the intended benefit of delivering more information to stakeholders by
exploiting the exogenous shock created by the U.K. reporting changes. Prior literature finds that
greater overall disclosure requirements as well as more specific disclosures in annual reports are
associated with decreases in information asymmetry (Botosan 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000;
Hail and Leuz 2006; De Franco et al. 2011; Lang et al. 2012; Campbell et al. 2014). Based on
this research, it is feasible that enhanced audit committee and auditor disclosures could reduce
information asymmetry by providing new and useful information to investors.2,3 It, however, is
also possible that investors could view the new disclosures as unnecessary in their evaluation of
a company or suffer from “information overload” and decide not to process the disclosures (You
and Zhang 2008; Miller 2010; Cardiff 2013; Cates 2013; Goff 2013; White 2013). Given the call
from investors for increased disclosures from auditors and audit committees (Carcello et al.
2011a; CFA 2011; Gray et al. 2011; Mock et al. 2013; PCAOB 2014), I predict that investors
will find the new reports more useful and the greater transparency will serve to reduce
information asymmetry.
1

Please refer to Section II for more information regarding the specifics of the new disclosure requirements.
In this paper, I use common proxies for information asymmetry to test the degree to which enhanced auditor and
audit committee reports provide new and useful information to investors. As decreases in information asymmetry
should result from the release of decision useful information to investors, these proxies are appropriate to determine
whether the reports contain decision useful “information content".
3
As discussed in Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), theory does not distinguish between information asymmetry that
arises between a firm and its shareholders and information asymmetry that is present among investors.
2
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Following prior literature, I measure information asymmetry using two proxies: abnormal
trading volume and abnormal bid-ask spreads (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; DeFond et al. 2007;
Bushee et al. 2010; Landsman et al. 2012; Blankespoor et al. 2014).4 A reduction in information
asymmetry would be indicated by an increase in abnormal trading volume and a decrease in
abnormal bid-ask spreads. In the U.K., earnings announcements are typically released several
weeks before the annual report and include substantially the same information as the annual
report with the exception of the audit committee and auditor reports.5 I therefore compare
abnormal trading volume and bid-ask spreads around the annual report issuance from the period
prior to the regulatory reform to the initial implementation year for each firm. This design allows
for the isolation of the change in information asymmetry attributable to the new audit committee
and auditor disclosures.
In an analysis of U.K. firms mandated to comply with the new reporting requirements, I
find that abnormal trading volume significantly increases while abnormal bid-ask spreads
significantly decrease from the year prior to the reporting changes to the first year the additional
disclosures are required. These results are also economically significant as I document a 13.7
percent increase in the ratio of annual report trading volume to estimation period trading volume
following the implementation of the new reporting regime. I also document that abnormal bidask spreads are, on average, 0.126 lower in the post-period relative to the pre-period, which is
economically significant as the mean abnormal bid-ask spread of the sample in the pre-period is
0.138. Taken together, these results provide statistically and economically significant evidence
that enhanced auditor and audit committee reports are associated with a reduction in information
asymmetry.
4
5

Note that Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) do not use an “abnormal” measure of trading volume and bid-ask spreads.
Please refer to Section III for more information.
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As the reporting changes are unlikely to affect all firms equally, I also perform crosssectional analyses to exploit the potential variation in the usefulness of the new disclosures.
Specifically, I expect firms with weaker information environments (as proxied by lower analyst
coverage) to benefit more from the enhanced auditor and audit committee reports. In line with
this prediction, I find greater reductions in information asymmetry as the number of analysts
following the firm decreases. Additionally, I perform an analysis of the differences in the
usefulness of the new reports based upon the degree of detail that tends to be included in certain
auditors’ reports under the new regime. A recent study of the new U.K. audit reports published
by Citigroup concludes that new audit reports issued by KPMG provide the most useful
disclosures among the Big 4 firms while the new EY reports provide the least useful information
among the Big 4 auditors (Fisher and Deans 2014). Based on this observation, I find some
evidence that information asymmetry decreased more (less) for firms audited by KPMG (EY)
compared to the remaining three Big 4 firms.
In the analyses described above, I employ a balanced panel by requiring each sample firm
to be present in both the pre and post periods. This technique uses each company as its own
control, which alleviates the threat of time-invariant, firm-level correlated omitted variables
(Carcello and Li 2013).6 It is also important to note that the information asymmetry measures
employed (i.e., abnormal trading volume and abnormal bid-ask spreads) capture the event period
volume and bid-ask spreads relative to estimation period values of these proxies. This design
mitigates the concern that other events occurring within a short time period before the annual
report release for each company are driving the results.7 As in any event study, however, there is
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In untabulated analyses, I use firm fixed effects and my results remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged.
The cross-sectional analyses also help mitigate the correlated omitted variable problem because the omitted
variable would need to affect the groups differently to remain a concern.
7
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still a concern that contemporaneous events may confound the analysis. To alleviate the concern
that global changes and events could influence the degree of information asymmetry present in
the market, I re-perform the analysis using two control groups. The first control group is
comprised of U.S. companies. These firms are affected by global events that also impact U.K.
firms, but they are not subject to the new U.K. reporting regime. In a full sample of U.K. and
U.S. firms as well as a propensity score matched sample, I find that abnormal trading volume
(abnormal bid-ask spreads) increase (decrease) more for U.K. firms compared to U.S. firms from
the pre-period to the post-period. The second control group consists of firms listed on the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which is a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange.
These firms are not subject to the revised auditor and audit committee report requirements, but
are affected by other U.K. specific events. The results indicate that compared to AIM firms,
firms complying with the new reporting requirements experience a greater decrease in
information asymmetry. Thus, these additional analyses continue to reveal the significant impact
enhanced auditor and audit committee disclosures have on the degree of information asymmetry
present and mitigate the threat that contemporaneous events are confounding the results of this
study.
Furthermore, to account for temporal changes within firms that are not associated with
the revised reporting requirements, I re-perform the tests using a strict change analysis. I find
that the increase (decrease) in abnormal trading volume (abnormal bid-ask spreads) is
significantly greater from the year prior (t-1) to the implementation year (t) than the change in
these measures from the two years prior (t-2) to the prior year (t-1). These results provide further
evidence of a decrease in information asymmetry due to the new auditor and audit committee
disclosures and provide comfort that the results are not driven by other factors that change over
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time.
Finally, I perform two additional analyses to mitigate the concern that the results are
driven by changes in management disclosure practices that may have occurred around the same
time as the implementation of the new auditor and audit committee reports. The only
management disclosure regulatory change that occurred during this timeframe was the formal
requirement of a strategic review in the annual report. I randomly select a sample of firms and
compare each company’s strategic report in the current year annual report to its business review
in the prior year annual report. Confirming the commonly held sentiment that the strategic report
requirement did not materially change management’s disclosures, I do not find any significant
differences in the primary disclosures. Therefore, the formal implementation of strategic reports
is unlikely to impact my analysis. In addition, I perform a falsification test by examining changes
in abnormal trading volume and abnormal bid-ask spreads around the earnings announcement
dates for the sample firms. Since the audit committee and auditor reports are not released to the
market until the annual report date, I do not expect to find significant changes around earnings
releases. Consistent with this expectation, I fail to find evidence of a reduction in information
asymmetry around earnings announcement dates. The lack of results assists in alleviating the
concern that the findings of this study are due to a change in management disclosure practices.
By examining the effect of the United Kingdom’s recent reporting regime changes on
investors, this study provides relevant and timely information about a highly debated regulatory
issue. I find that additional mandated auditor and audit committee disclosures provide investors
with new and useful information that impacts their trading decisions. This reduction in
information asymmetry affects public companies, investors, regulators, other financial statement
users, and the overall capital markets. In addition to commenting on the effect of these changes
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in the United Kingdom (an important market to examine in isolation), this setting informs the
debates occurring globally. 8 Regulatory bodies, including the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), and the European Parliament, are also
deliberating the enhancement of audit committee and auditor reporting. In particular, given the
legal and cultural similarities between the United Kingdom and the United States, the
examination of the U.K.’s revised regulations presents important considerations for the
evaluation of the standards proposed by regulators in the United States.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background on
auditor and audit committee reporting and develops the primary hypothesis. Section III outlines
the research method and discusses the sample. Section IV presents the results of the study and
Section V describes additional analyses. The final section concludes.

8

The United Kingdom ranked fourth in market capitalization of all countries with over $3 trillion in market
capitalization in 2012 behind the United States, China, and Japan (WorldBank 2014).
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Background on the U.S. Audit Report
“Audits of public companies can involve scores of auditors, thousands of hours, and
millions in fees. The documentation in support of the auditor’s opinion is voluminous.
Indeed, with the possible exception of senior financial management, in most cases, the
auditor knows more about the financial statements and financial reporting risk of the
audited company than other individuals, both inside and outside the company
(including members of the audit committee). Notwithstanding this significant
accumulated knowledge, the only communication between the auditor and investors is
typically a boilerplate three-paragraph letter (hardly a ‘‘report,’’ despite the commonly
used title) that is essentially identical for the overwhelming majority of all public
companies” (Blake et al. 2011).
As described in the above quote, some stakeholders are frustrated with the limited
information provided by the audit report despite the substantial work performed and insight
obtained by the external auditor. While several groups have recommended changes to the
standardized “pass/fail” model (AICPA 1978; NCFFR 1987), the U.S. audit report has only been
revised twice since its initial adoption in the United States during the 1940s: (1) the inclusion of
a scope paragraph per SAS No. 58 in 1988 and (2) the requirement to report on internal control
over financial reporting per Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.9 Studies that
examine these previous changes to the U.S. auditor’s report find mixed evidence as to whether
the revised reports provide incremental value to financial statement users. Some surveys of
investors, bankers, and loan officers document that additional communication from auditors
enhances the users’ understanding of the audit and impacts their investment decisions while
other empirical research fails to find a significant impact of the “new” reports (Beneish et al.
2008; Kelly and Mohrweis 1989; Miller et al. 1993).

9

The American Institute of Accountants (AIA) and the New York Stock Exchange worked together to improve
financial reporting and out of this cooperation, published a recommended audit report format in 1934. A standard
audit report, however, was not formally adopted until the AIA’s members approved the adoption of auditing
standards in 1948 (Carmichael and Winters 1982).
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Studies examining the current U.S. audit report conclude that the report has some
“symbolic value, but conveys little communicative value” due to its standardized nature (Church
et al. 2008). Prior research also reveals that users sometimes misinterpret the terminology
included in the report as well as the level of assurance provided by the auditor (Asare and Wright
2012; Gray et al. 2011). Participants in a focus group conducted by Gray et al. (2011) suggest
that audit reports would provide more meaningful information if client-specific content was
included rather than the boilerplate report currently issued. 10 Furthermore, a survey of
sophisticated financial statement users reports that 79 percent of the participants want more
informative audit report disclosures regarding management’s significant judgments and estimates
(Carcello et al. 2011a). Additionally, 77 percent of the respondents desire auditor disclosures of
the greatest financial statement and audit risks as well as the audit procedures performed to
address the risks (Carcello et al. 2011a).11
In response to stakeholder dissatisfaction with the current auditor report, regulators have
taken action to improve the transparency of the audit report. Most notably, the PCAOB proposed
a new audit reporting model on August 13, 2013 (PCAOB 2013). The proposed changes are
aimed at providing more insight into the audit process and creating a report that is entity and
engagement specific. The revisions, if passed, would require a discussion of critical audit matters
(“CAMs”) in order to increase transparency in the areas that were the most significant and/or
most difficult in the audit.12 The PCAOB’s proposal also requires additional information on the
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Similarly, Turner et al. (2010) recommend an expanded audit report that varies from client to client and discusses
several items including materiality, auditor independence, financial statement and reporting system quality, and
business sustainability. Furthermore, Mock et al. (2013) determine that stakeholders “desire more information about
the auditor, the audit, and the financial statements”.
11
Also refer to the CFA Institute’s 2011 survey of its members. 58 percent of the respondents indicated that the
auditor’s report should provide more specific information about how the auditors reached their opinion (CFA 2011).
12
In particular, the proposed rule defines critical audit matters as “those matters addressed during the audit that (1)
involved the most difficult, subjective, or complex auditor judgments; (2) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in
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auditor’s independence, tenure, and responsibilities for fraud and financial statement notes
(PCAOB 2013).13
Recent experimental studies reveal potential benefits and consequences of the PCAOB’s
proposed rule. Christensen et al. (2014) examine the relevance of the PCAOB’s critical audit
matter proposed rule by performing an experiment with nonprofessional investors. The authors
find that investors are more likely to alter their investment decision when the standard audit
report contains a discussion of critical audit matters compared to investors that were provided
with the standard audit report (Christensen et al. 2014). Kachelmeier et al. (2014), however,
reveal a potential unintended consequence of the PCAOB’s proposal as their experiment
suggests that the disclosure of a CAM is viewed as a “partial disclaimer of auditor responsibility
for the area identified as a CAM”.
Background on the U.S. Audit Committee Report
Audit committees are recognized as integral components of a well functioning financial
reporting environment. They are responsible for overseeing managements’ financial reporting
processes as well as the audit processes of public companies (Beasley et al. 2009). While the
importance of audit committees has been widely accepted and documented (see Carcello et al.
(2011b) for a literature review), the communication between these committees and stakeholders
is fairly limited. In the United States, the preparation of an audit committee report was voluntary
until the SEC adopted a rule in 2000 that requires publicly listed companies to include a report in

obtaining sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in forming the opinion on
the financial statements” (PCAOB 2013).
13
Audit reporting changes have also been proposed by the IAASB and the European Parliament. The IAASB
proposed an audit report model in July of 2013 that requires auditors to include key audit matters (“KAMs”), which
are similar to the PCAOB’s “CAMs” (IAASB 2013b). In addition, in April 2014, the European Parliament endorsed
a draft agreement that requires audit reports to provide an assessment of the firm’s overall financial statements as
well as detailed information of the audit process that allowed the auditor to appropriately make the assessment
(Cohn 2014).
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its annual proxy statement that states whether the committee fulfilled its responsibilities (SEC
2000). 14 This rule was enacted with the intention of promoting investor confidence in the
financial reporting process (SEC 2000). While studies find that most listed companies properly
adopted the newly mandated audit committee disclosures (Pandit et al. 2006; Rezaee et al. 2003),
the level of voluntary disclosures is variable (Carcello et al. 2002; Pandit et al. 2006).
In recent years, the value of audit committee disclosures has been questioned. The
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) reports that the audit committees’
disclosures are minimalistic and do not adequately communicate the work performed by audit
committees (NACD 2013). In its review of voluntary audit committee disclosures, Ernst &
Young finds that only eight percent of the sample companies disclosed specific matters discussed
by audit committees and auditors (EY 2013a). Given the limited information provided by audit
committee reports, various groups have called for greater audit committee transparency. For
instance, in response to the PCAOB’s Concept Release on mandatory audit firm rotation issued
on August 16, 2011, many comment letters opposed rotation but suggested increasing audit
committee disclosures regarding its role in the external audit process in order to improve audit
independence without the potential costs of rotation (EY 2013b). Even some audit committee
members desire the expansion of audit committee disclosure as one delegate at the 2013 NACD
meeting stated: “Frankly we don’t do a good job of communicating what we do. The public
doesn’t see all the work we do, quarter after quarter” (NACD 2013).
Professional governance advocates have formally discussed audit committee report
improvements in the United States. For example, on November 20, 2013 the Center for Audit
14

Prior studies find that very few firms included a separate audit committee report in their annual report and, of the
companies that did voluntarily provide an audit committee report, Turpin and DeZoort (1998) document that the
reports were boilerplate.
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Quality (CAQ) issued a powerful “call to action” to “encourage all public company audit
committees to thoughtfully reassess their reporting and communication with stakeholders and, if
need be, to strengthen them in the future” (CAQ 2013). The Investor Advisory Group (IAG) of
the PCAOB presented a report at a board meeting held on October 20, 2014 that evaluated the
current state of audit committee regulation and noted the need for more transparency from audit
committees in the United States (IAG 2014).15 These requests from governance advocates and
the IAG have prompted regulatory action. The SEC plans to issue a concept release in early 2015
that will explore possible changes to the audit committee report in order to provide more useful
information to investors (Heller 2014; White 2014; Whitehouse 2014).
United Kingdom Reporting Regime Changes
In the fall of 2012, the FRC issued changes to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, its
Guidance for Audit Committees, and the International Standards on Auditing (U.K. and Ireland).
Effective for financial years ending on or after September 30, 2013, this regulatory reform
requires additional disclosures in the audit committee report as well as additional language in the
auditor’s report. Specifically, the FRC issued revised governance policies instructing audit
committees to include in their report “the significant issues that the committee considered in
relation to the financial statements and how these issues were addressed, having regard to
matters communicated to it by the auditors” (FRC 2012b). Furthermore, if the auditor is not
satisfied with the audit committee’s reporting of the matters communicated by the auditor to the
audit committee, then the auditor is obligated to include such information in the auditor’s report
(FRC 2012a). The revised standard also added the requirement to discuss the evaluation of the
external audit as well as the process by which the external auditor is appointed or reappointed
15

Also, in April 2013, the Council of Institutional Investors revised its policies on audit committee reporting to
include more information about the committee’s role and operations (CII 2013).
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(FRC 2012b). In addition, the audit committee report must include information on audit firm
tenure and state the timing of the most recent tendering of the audit contract (FRC 2012b).16
The FRC implemented further changes to the auditor’s report when it issued revisions to
the International Standard on Auditing (U.K. and Ireland) 700 in June 2013. These reforms also
take effect for financial years ending on or after September 30, 2013 and instruct auditors to
include a discussion of assessed risks of material misstatement, materiality, and the scope of the
audit in their report (FRC 2013). Specifically, the auditor is required to describe risks that had
the “greatest effect on the overall audit strategy, the allocation of resources in the audit, and
directing the efforts of the engagement team” (FRC 2013). With regard to materiality, the audit
report should now include an explanation of how materiality was applied during the planning and
performance of the audit as well as a disclosure of the specific materiality threshold employed in
the audit (FRC 2013). Finally, the auditor is directed to provide information about how the scope
of the audit addressed the assessed risks of material misstatement as well as how the auditor’s
materiality determination influenced the scope of the audit (FRC 2013).17
The study of the United Kingdom’s new reporting regime is critical to inform the debates
occurring internationally. While investors have requested more disclosures from both auditors
and audit committees, it is unknown ex-ante whether the new information will be useful to
investors. The evidence thus far has been limited to surveys, focus groups, and experiments
given that reporting reforms have not been implemented in the United States or a similar country

16

An additional piece of the regulation requires audit committees of FTSE 350 companies to retender the audit
contract at least every 10 years on a “comply or explain” basis.
17
For an example of the new audit committee and auditor reports, please refer to pages 44 – 46 and 130 – 135,
respectively, of the Rolls-Royce 2013 annual report found at http://www.rolls-royce.com/Images/RR_Full%20
Annual %20Report__tcm92-55530.pdf.
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until recently.18 This study uses the U.K.’s reporting changes as a “quasi-natural experiment” to
determine if investors did in fact find the new reports useful. My analysis is particularly relevant
to the reporting debate occurring in the United States as these two countries share similar levels
of disclosure and securities regulation as well comparable cultures and accounting traditions
(Hail and Leuz 2006; La Porta et al. 1997). Furthermore, as highlighted in the above discussion,
the audit committee and auditor report changes being considered in the United States are similar
to those recently implemented in the United Kingdom.
Hypothesis Development
Prior literature examining overall disclosure environments generally finds that greater
disclosure requirements are associated with benefits to capital markets in the form of decreased
information asymmetry. Hail and Leuz (2006), for instance, find that firms in countries with
greater disclosure requirements are associated with a significantly lower cost of capital.
Similarly, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document that German firms switching to a higher
standard of disclosure are associated with decreased information asymmetry as proxied by lower
bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume. Lang et al. (2012) also reveal lower transaction costs
and increased liquidity for companies with greater transparency. Furthermore, Blankespoor et al.
(2014) find that voluntary disclosure of firm news through Twitter is associated with lower
abnormal bid-ask spreads and greater liquidity.
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To my knowledge, the only country that previously introduced additional language in a standard audit report is
France. As part of its Financial Security Act effective August 1, 2003, France requires auditors to make
“justifications of assessments” related to accounting policy choice, significant accounting estimates, financial
statement presentation, and internal controls (CNCC 2011). France’s Financial Security Act is similar to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It was designed to improve investor confidence in the French capital markets by reinforcing
investor protection, improving the supervision of financial activities, modernizing the external audit function, and
improving corporate transparency. Given this broad range of issues, I do not use this regulatory change in France as
a setting for testing the auditor’s report. In addition, the study of the French auditor’s report would limit the
generalizability to the U.S. due to the significant differences between the two countries. For example, France
operates under civil law while the U.S. operates under common law (La Porta et al. 1997).
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In addition, academic studies have examined the information content of specific
documents, including 10-K reports and audit opinions. Botosan (1997), for example, finds that
greater voluntary disclosure in a firm’s annual report is associated with a lower cost of equity
capital for firms with low analyst coverage. By examining stock returns around 10-K filings, De
Franco et al. (2011) determine that detailed footnote information can enhance the usefulness of
annual reports. Campbell et al. (2014) examine the SEC mandate to include a risk factor section
in 10-K filings and find that the disclosures provide valuable information to users as evidenced
by the consideration of the risk factors in investor assessments of firm value. More specifically
related to the audit environment, Gassen and Skaife (2009) find that mandating disclosure of
going concern issues increased the information content of audit reports in Germany as measured
by significant negative abnormal returns after the reforms compared to no market reaction prior.
Based on this prior disclosure research, it seems feasible that enhanced audit committee
and auditor disclosure requirements could decrease information asymmetry by providing new
and useful information to investors in several ways. For one, the increased disclosures could
provide investors an opportunity to gain a glimpse at the valuable perspective that auditors and
audit committees have on companies, which would aid in investment decisions. In particular, the
inclusion of critical financial statement risks in the audit committee and auditor reports could
focus the attention of investors on “issues that would be pertinent to understanding the financial
statements” (Buller 2013). Furthermore, increased knowledge of the audit process and the audit
committee’s oversight of the auditor may better equip investors in their evaluation of these
monitors, which could impact the informational value investors assign to their reports. In
addition, insight into the work performed by audit committees and auditors could build greater
public trust and confidence in the entire financial reporting process (Touche 2014). Specifically
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related to the audit reporting enhancements, global asset manager Hermes stated in its comment
letter to the FRC that “disclosing this information will provide shareholders with fuller insights
into the audit process, potentially instilling greater confidence in the quality of the audit and the
value added by the process, and so also instilling greater confidence in the quality of corporate
reporting” (Melvin 2013). Similarly, clearer communication of the audit committee’s activities
and responsibilities should enhance “users’ perceptions of audit quality” as it provides
confirmation of the “active involvement of a high-quality, transparent audit committee” (IAASB
2013a). If the new reports do serve to increase investors’ trust in the audit committee’s oversight
and the auditor’s procedures, then investors are likely to rely more on the information in their
trading decisions.
It, however, is possible that the additional disclosures required in the audit committee and
auditor reports may not be useful to investors for several reasons. First, the information provided
may simply be of little interest to financial statement users. For example, even though KPMG
UK has been in favor of enhancing the audit report, the firm’s comment letter to the FRC stated
they do not “expect shareholders would find descriptions of just the audit process of great
interest – as, for example, car drivers do not normally want a long description of an electronic
diagnostic process when their car is serviced” (Cates 2013). It is therefore possible that investors
may not view information provided about the auditor’s process and the audit committee’s work
as relevant to their trading decisions. Furthermore, the additional information may not add any
real substance as the disclosures do not alter the overall opinion of the auditors and audit
committees (Cardiff 2013). In the case of the audit report, for instance, the main objective of the
report is the pass/fail opinion, which remains unchanged by the inclusion of the additional audit
process information. Second, there have been numerous regulatory and standard setting
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enhancements over the past decade that have “increased the investing public’s confidence in the
quality of a registrants’ financial statements” (e.g., management certification of the financial
statements in the U.S. and the audit partner signature requirement in the U.K.) (Goff 2013;
Carcello and Li 2013). Additional disclosures in the audit committee and auditor reports may not
provide any “meaningful benefit” given the insight investors currently have in the firms in which
they invest (Goff 2013). Third, it is possible that investors may suffer from “information
overload – a phenomenon in which ever-increasing amounts of disclosure make it difficult for an
investor to wade through the volume of information she receives to ferret out the information
that is most relevant” (White 2013). Prior literature examining the complexity of annual report
disclosures have found some evidence of an “information overload” effect as they report that
greater complexity is associated with users opting out of processing the disclosures (Miller 2010;
You and Zhang 2008). It is therefore possible that investors may not find the additional
disclosures valuable in their trading decisions if they view them as uninteresting, unnecessary, or
too daunting to process.
Given the call from investors for increased disclosures from auditors and audit
committees (Carcello et al. 2011a; CFA 2011; Gray et al. 2011; Mock et al. 2013; PCAOB
2014), I predict that investors will find the new reports more useful and the greater transparency
will serve to reduce information asymmetry. I thus state the following hypothesis in alternative
form:
H1: Additional required disclosures in audit committee and auditor reports reduce information
asymmetry.
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III. RESEARCH METHOD
Information Asymmetry Analysis
To test H1, I utilize two proxies for information asymmetry: abnormal trading volume
(Asthana et al. 2004; DeFond et al. 2007; Landsman et al. 2012) and abnormal bid-ask spreads
(Bushee et al. 2010; Blankespoor et al. 2014). A reduction in information asymmetry, as
predicted in H1, would be indicated by an increase in abnormal trading volume and a decrease in
abnormal bid-ask spreads. I focus on these measures as prior literature contends that volume is
the “most visible indicator of investors’ response to public disclosures” (Miller 2010) and the
bid-ask spread is “commonly thought to measure information asymmetry explicitly” (Leuz and
Verrecchia 2000). More specifically, trading volume captures liquidity and the willingness of
investors to sell and others to buy. Therefore, the greater the willingness of market participants to
transact in firm shares, the less information asymmetry present (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).
Similarly, bid-ask spreads represent the cost arising from the presence of asymmetrically
informed investors in the market and the more narrow the spread, the fewer information
asymmetries (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).
These proxies also have the benefit of being calculated over a short time horizon, which
allows me to take advantage of the unique relation between earnings announcements and annual
report filings in the United Kingdom. Specifically, earnings announcements are released several
weeks before the annual report, but contain largely the same information as the annual report.19,20
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I randomly selected 40 companies and examined the earnings releases for each. The documents contain an average
of 42 pages with many reports over 75 pages (maximum length: 132 pages). Furthermore, all of them contained a
discussion of the business strategy/results, financial statements, and condensed footnotes. It is also important to note
that earnings were announced prior to the release of the annual report for each firm-year observation included in the
sample.
20
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) states that a preliminary statement of annual results (i.e., the earnings
announcement) must show financial results consistent with the presentation to be adopted in the annual report, must
include any significant additional information necessary to assess the reported results, and must give details of any
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The primary difference between the two filings in the United Kingdom is the inclusion of the
audit report and the audit committee report.21 Therefore, by examining differences in abnormal
trading volume and abnormal bid-ask spreads around the annual reports before and after the
reporting revisions, I am able to isolate the change in information asymmetry attributable to the
additional audit committee and auditor disclosures. I employ the following regression models to
do so:
AVOLit = β0 + β1POSTit + β2LN_MVEit + β3NUM_ANALYSTit + β4SD_CFOit +

(1)

β5DISPit +β6LOSSit + β7UEit + β8LAGit + IND_FE + εit
ASPREADit = β0 + β1POSTit + β2LN_MVEit + β3NUM_ANALYSTit + β4SD_CFOit +

(2)

β5DISPit +β6LOSSit + β7UEit + β8LAGit + IND_FE + εit
Abnormal trading volume (AVOL) equals the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s
mean event-period volume to the firm’s average estimation-period volume (DeFond et al. 2007;
Landsman et al. 2012).22 The event-period volume is the daily volume for a firm on the two-day
window beginning on the firm’s event date scaled by its shares outstanding during the event
period (DeFond et al. 2007). The estimation-period volume is measured over the trading period
beginning 61 days before the earnings announcement date and ending 40 days later (i.e., 21 days
before the earnings release) (DeFond et al. 2007; Miller 2010).23 The abnormal bid-ask spread
(ASPREAD) is calculated as a firm’s average event-period daily percent spread less the firm’s
mean estimation-period daily percent spread (Blankespoor et al. 2014; Bushee et al. 2010). The
likely modification of the auditor report to be included in the annual report (FCA 2012).
21
Other governance reports, such as the nomination committee, ethics committee, and risk committee reports, would
also be “new” information in the annual report compared to the earnings announcement. These reports, however,
have not systematically changed across companies in the period examined in this study.
22
As in Landsman et al. (2012), AVOL is highly skewed prior to taking the natural logarithm. The skewness
coefficient before taking the natural log is 45.26 compared to a skewness coefficient of -0.29 after.
23
Note that the estimation-period is measured relative to the earnings announcement date when calculating AVOL.
This is done to ensure that the estimation period for the annual report date does not include the filing of the earnings
release.
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daily percent spread equals the bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask price,
all multiplied by 100.24 To ensure consistency, the same event-period and estimation-period are
used to compute ASPREAD and AVOL. The variable of interest, POST, equals one if the fiscal
year is the first year of the new reporting regime and zero otherwise. In line with H1, I expect the
coefficient on POST (β1) to be positive and significant in model (1) and negative and significant
in model (2) as I predict that the new audit committee and auditor reports will be more useful to
investors compared to the previously required reports and serve to reduce information
asymmetry.
Following prior literature (DeFond et al. 2007; Landsman et al. 2012; Blankespoor et al.
2014), I include several controls in the model that may impact a firm’s abnormal trading volume
and bid-ask spread.25,26 Firm size (LN_MVE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity at the firm’s fiscal year-end. Since prior research reports mixed results for the
association between firm size and abnormal trading activity (i.e., volume and bid-ask spreads), I
do not make a prediction for this coefficient (Bamber et al. 2011). I also control for other aspects
of a firm’s information environment, including the number of analysts following the firm
(NUM_ANALYST), the reporting lag between the earnings announcement and the issuance of the
annual report (LAG), the firm’s cash flow volatility (SD_CFO), and the standard deviation of
analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by stock price (DISP).27 Following prior literature, I expect
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As in Blankespoor et al. (2014), I remove spreads greater than 90 percent of the midpoint price. Results remain
quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged if this restriction is not imposed.
25
Following prior literature, equations (1) and (2) do not include a control for the type of auditor employed by the
firm. In untabulated tests, the results remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged by the inclusion of an
indicator for Big 4 auditors. I also eliminate six firms from the analysis that experienced an auditor switch and
results remain unchanged in untabulated tests. Please refer to Section V for an additional analysis of auditor type.
26
In untabulated tests, I control for the abnormal trading volume and abnormal bid-ask spread around the firm’s
earnings announcement date. Results remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged. Please refer to Section V
for more information on earnings announcement tests.
27
In untabulated tests, I replace LAG with (1) the time between the fiscal year-end and the earnings announcement
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analyst coverage to be related to a decrease in information asymmetry while reporting lag is
predicted to be associated with an increase in information asymmetry (DeFond et al. 2007;
Landsman et al. 2012). Furthermore, abnormal trading activity during this time period could be
attributed to the earnings reported by the firm. I therefore include an indicator for negative
earnings (LOSS) and the absolute value of unexpected earnings (UE). As in DeFond et al. (2007)
and Landsman et al. (2012), I predict that LOSS will be associated with an increase in
information asymmetry. In addition, I employ industry fixed effects (IND_FE) to take into
account the likely differences in trading volume and bid-ask spreads across industries. Refer to
Appendix B for complete variable definitions.
Sample
The regulatory changes in the United Kingdom apply to firms that are required to comply
with the U.K. Corporate Governance Code. Only entities with a Premium listing of equity shares
on the London Stock Exchange are subject to the Governance Code (FRC 2012b, 2013). I
therefore obtain a record of all companies with a Premium listing on the London Stock Exchange
from the exchange’s website (N=937). Of these Premium listings, 428 observations relate to
investment funds. Given the unique characteristics of investments funds, I exclude these listings
and focus the analysis on commercial equity companies (N=509).
As the regulatory changes became effective for financial years beginning on or after
October 1, 2012, I obtain data related to the first annual report issued under the new regime (t) as
well as the last annual report filed under the previous standards (t-1).28 I employ a balanced panel

and (2) the time between the fiscal year-end and the issuance of the annual report. The results of the analysis are
unchanged using these alternate definitions of LAG.
28
Only three companies, to my knowledge, voluntarily adopted these requirements in the prior reporting period:
Vodafone Group, British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC, and Ashmore Group PLC. These observations are excluded
from my analysis. In untabulated tests, I include data for these firms related to their voluntary adoption year and the
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by requiring the necessary data for each firm in both time periods. This approach allows the
comparison of firms in the pre-period to the same firms in the post-period, which reduces the
threat of firm-level correlated omitted variables (Doyle and Magilke 2013). I hand collect the
annual report dates from Bloomberg for t and t-1, which results in the loss of 101 firms missing
an annual report date for one or both periods. I gather daily volume, daily bid and ask prices, and
relevant financial statement data for control variables from Datastream. In addition, I obtain
analyst forecast data including earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S on Datastream. After
gathering all requisite data, the final sample is comprised of 291 firms (or 582 firm-year
observations). Refer to Table 1 for more detail related to sample construction.
<Insert Table 1 Here>

prior year and the results remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged.
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IV. RESULTS
Univariate Results
Table 2 presents the comparison of the means of each dependent variable (AVOL and
ASPREAD) as well as each control variable for the pre-period (POST=0) and the post-period
(POST=1). Abnormal trading volume (AVOL) around the annual report release date significantly
increased from -0.038 prior to the new reporting requirements to 0.096 during the first year of
implementation of the new auditor and audit committee reports (p<0.05). 29 Furthermore,
abnormal bid-ask spreads (ASPREAD) significantly decreased from 0.138 in the pre-period to
0.002 in the post-period (p<0.01).30 These univariate results provide initial evidence in support of
H1. Specifically, the preliminary findings indicate that the enhanced audit committee and auditor
reports are associated with reductions in information asymmetry as measured by higher abnormal
trading volume and lower abnormal bid-ask spreads.
It is important to note that there are no statistically significant differences in the control
variables between the pre-period and the post-period, which suggests that the sample firms did
not meaningfully change in the two time periods examined. Table 2 also reveals that the
companies included in this study are large firms (mean LN_MVE of 14.367 in the post period and
14.175 in the pre period) that are covered by 11 to 12 analysts on average (NUM_ANALYST).
The average lag between the earnings announcement and the issuance of the annual report
(LAG) is around 27 days in both periods. The analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) of the sample
firms is low with a mean dispersion of 0.009 in both the pre and post periods. Furthermore, only
29

I also compute AVOL without taking the natural logarithm to provide an easier interpretation of the abnormal
trading volume ratio. This unlogged version has a mean of 1.45 in the pre-period and 2.07 in the post-period. The
results using the unlogged version are quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged. It is also worth noting that
negative means/medians of AVOL are common around annual report dates (Asthana et al. 2004; Miller 2010).
30
The positive values for ASPREAD indicate that on average the issuance of the annual report does not lower
information asymmetry relative to the estimation period. This is similar to prior studies that reveal that ASPREAD
on average is positive around earnings announcements (Bushee et al. 2010).
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14 – 15 percent of the firms record a loss (LOSS) in the pre and post periods, suggesting that the
sample is comprised of profitable firms on average. Additionally, the mean unexpected earnings
(UE) and cash flow volatility (SD_CFO) of the sample firms in the post-period are 0.015 and
0.041, respectively.
<Insert Table 2 Here>
Multivariate Results
Table 3 presents the findings from the estimation of equations (1) and (2). Column 1
reveals that POST is positively associated with AVOL (p<0.05), which suggests that abnormal
trading volume significantly increased around the annual reports issued under the new reporting
regime compared to the prior period. This result is also economically significant as I document a
13.7 percent increase in the ratio of annual report trading volume to estimation period trading
volume from the pre-period to the post-period.31 Similarly, column 2 of Table 3 indicates that
POST is negatively associated with ASPREAD (p<0.05), suggesting that abnormal bid-ask
spreads significantly decreased surrounding the release of the annual reports in the first year of
implementation relative to the previous year. Economically, abnormal bid-ask spreads are, on
average, 0.126 lower in the post-period relative to the pre-period. This is economically
significant as the mean abnormal bid-ask spread of the sample in the pre-period is 0.138. Taken
together, these results provide statistically and economically significant evidence that the
enhanced auditor and audit committee reports are more useful to investors than the previously
required reports. Thus, in support of H1, I find that the new reporting regime significantly
decreased the degree of information asymmetry present.
<Insert Table 3 Here>
31

The increase is calculated as the percentage change in the dependent variable from the pre-period to the postperiod. This percentage change is defined as ez – 1, where z is the coefficient on the independent variable.
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In regard to the control variables, the results tend to follow prior literature. As found in
DeFond et al. (2007) and Landsman et al. (2012), the number of analysts (NUM_ANALYST) is
positively associated with abnormal trading volume whereas the reporting lag (LAG) is related to
lower abnormal trading volume. These results indicate that the market on average views the
annual reports of firms with greater analyst coverage and lower reporting lags as more useful and
informative. I also find that the size of the company (LN_MVE) is associated with lower bid-ask
spreads, suggesting that larger firms on average experience less information asymmetry.
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V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Cross-Sectional Tests
In the main analysis, I find that revised audit committee and auditor report requirements
are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry. The reporting changes, however, are
unlikely to affect all firms equally. In this section, I identify sources of potential variation in the
usefulness of the additional disclosures and perform cross-sectional analyses to exploit this
heterogeneity.
Analyst Coverage Analysis
I expect the enhanced auditor and audit committee disclosures to have a greater impact on
firms with weaker information environments. I use analyst coverage as a proxy for the amount of
information disclosed and available to investors about the firm (Botosan 1997; Miller 2010;
Blankespoor et al. 2014). The more communication provided to investors from the firm or
through analysts, the less disclosures from other parties, including auditors and audit committees,
will likely impact investor’s trading decisions. I therefore expect that additional disclosures in
auditor and audit committee reports to have a greater effect on investors in firms with lower
analyst following. To test this prediction, I estimate equations (1) and (2) on subsamples divided
at the median analyst coverage (median NUM_ANALYST=10). I also estimate the models on the
full sample and include an interaction of POST and NUM_ANALYST.
Panels A and B of Table 4 present the results of this analysis for AVOL and ASPREAD,
respectively. Column 1 of Panel A (B) reveals that firms with a high analyst following do not
experience a significant increase (decrease) in abnormal trading volume (abnormal bid-ask
spreads) around the implementation of the auditor and audit committee report revisions. In
column 2 of Panels A and B, however, I find that firms with low analyst coverage are associated
with a significant increase in abnormal trading volume and a significant decrease in abnormal
27

bid-ask spreads from the pre-period to the post-period (both p<0.05). In the third column of each
panel, I include the interaction of POST and NUM_ANALYST and re-run the analysis on the full
sample of firms. The negative (positive) coefficient on the interaction term in Panel A (B)
suggests that as analyst coverage increases, the less information asymmetry is reduced from the
year prior to the regulatory changes to the first year of implementation (p<0.05 and p<0.10,
respectively). In other words, as the information environment weakens (i.e., analyst following
decreases), the greater the reduction in information asymmetry as a result of the additional
auditor and audit committee disclosures.
<Insert Table 4 Here>
Auditor Analysis
Audit firms likely implemented the revised report requirements in their own fashions, and
therefore, it is probable that the degree to which investors found a firm’s new audit report useful
varies by auditor. 32 , 33 In fact, a recent study published by Citigroup reveals meaningful
differences among the new U.K. audit reports issued by the Big 4 firms (Fisher and Deans 2014).
The researchers conclude that “KPMG [includes] the most useful analysis of risk, while the lack
of detail provided means EY typically lags behind the other Big 4 in its discussion of risk”
(Fisher and Deans 2014).34 I explore whether investors responded to these differences in new
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While not directly tested, it is also likely like that the information disclosed in the auditor’s report influences the
information contained in the audit committee report. In future tests, I will use hand collected data from both audit
and audit committee reports to further explore the effects of reporting differences.
33
In untabulated tests, I examine whether the impact of the auditor and audit committee report revisions on
abnormal trading volume and bid-ask spreads varied between firms with a Big 4 auditor versus firms with a non-Big
4 auditor. However, since Big 4 firms audit over 92 percent of the companies in this study’s main sample, it is not
surprising that I do not document a differential impact based on whether the firm is audited by a Big 4 or non-Big 4
auditor.
34
The Citigroup report appears to deem a report useful if the information provided is entity-specific and if there is a
great degree of detail regarding risks, materiality, and scope. KPMG UK has also stated that they expect
“shareholders to be more interested in matters like misstatements or disagreements with management identified
during the audit and how these have been resolved” (Cates 2013). In fact, KPMG UK has now formally
implemented an approach to reporting that goes further than the FRC’s requirements (Collins and Cates 2014).
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reports issued by KPMG and EY. Based on Citigroup’s observation, I expect to find that
information asymmetry decreased more (less) for firms audited by KPMG (EY) compared to the
remaining Big 4 firms. To test this expectation, I create an indicator variable for firms audited by
KPMG in the current year (KPMG) and another variable for firms audited by Ernst & Young in
the current year (EY). I limit the sample to companies audited by a Big 4 firm in order to
compare each of these audit firms to the remaining three. After eliminating six firms that
switched auditors from the pre-period to the post-period, I estimate models (1) and (2) including
one of the audit firm indicators (EY or KPMG) and the interaction of the auditor indicator and
POST. In untabulated tests, I find that abnormal trading volume increased more (less) for firms
audited by KPMG (EY) compared to the remaining three audit firms from the pre-period to the
post-period (p<0.10 and p<0.05, respectively). The abnormal bid-ask spread tests do not reveal
significant differences between KPMG (EY) and the remaining Big 4 firms surrounding the
implementation of the new report requirements, but the coefficient on POST x KPMG is negative
(p=0.15) and the coefficient on POST x EY is positive (p=0.19) as expected. These tests provide
some evidence in support of Citigroup’s observation that the information contained in the reports
issued by KPMG (EY) are more (less) useful than the reports issued by the other major audit
firms under the new reporting regime.
Control Group Analysis
US Control Group
While the use of a balanced sample reduces the threat of time-invariant firm-specific
characteristics that may confound the analysis, it is possible that global changes and events
occurring during the same timeframe as the revisions to the audit committee and auditor
reporting standards could influence the degree of information asymmetry present in the market. I
therefore re-perform the analysis using a control group of U.S. companies since these firms are
29

impacted by global events that also affect U.K. companies, but they are not subject to the new
U.K. reporting regime. The use of this control group therefore mitigates the concern that global
changes might be correlated omitted variables (Carcello and Li 2013).
I gather data for all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that are
included in Compustat, I/B/E/S, Audit Analytics, and Datastream.35 The final sample consists of
1,760 U.S. firm-year observations and 582 U.K. firm-year observations. 36 Using this sample, I
estimate models (1) and (2) adding an indicator variable for the U.K. premium companies (UK)
as well as an interaction of POST and UK. Since U.S. firms are not subject to the enhanced
auditor and audit committee reporting requirements, I expect abnormal trading volume
(abnormal bid-ask spreads) to increase (decrease) more for U.K. firms compared to U.S. firms
from the pre-period to the post-period. As such, I predict that the coefficient on POST x UK will
be positive in the estimation of model (1) and negative in the estimation of model (2). In line
with these expectations, I find that POST x UK is significantly positive in column 1 of Table 5
(p<0.10) and significantly negative in column 2 (p<0.01).
Furthermore, to ensure these results are not due to fundamental observable differences in
U.K. and U.S. firms, I create a propensity score matched sample and re-perform the analysis.
The propensity score matching model employs UK as the dependent variable and uses all control
variables from equations (1) and (2). Using the propensity scores generated from this model, I

35

Note that Datastream is used to gather trading volume and bid-ask spread data since CRSP data is only available
through December 31, 2013.
36
Twenty-one of the U.K. Premium equity companies in the sample are cross-listed on the NYSE. I perform two
untabulated tests related to these firms. First, I exclude the cross-listed observations and the results remain
quantitatively and qualitatively the same. Second, I restrict the U.K. sample to the 21 firms cross-listed in the U.S.
and find that compared to U.S. firms, the U.K. cross-listed firms have a larger decrease in abnormal bid-ask spreads
(p<0.05) from the pre-period to the post-period. The coefficient on POST x UK in the abnormal trading volume
model is positive, but insignificant using this significantly reduced sample.
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match U.K. firms to U.S. firms with the closest score.37 Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 indicate that
the results hold using this matched sample. Specifically, the coefficient on POST x UK is
significantly positive in the estimation of model (1) and significantly negative in the estimation
of model (2) (both p<0.05). Taken together, these results continue to demonstrate the significant
impact enhanced auditor and audit committee disclosures have on the degree of information
asymmetry present in the firms required to comply with the regulatory changes.
<Insert Table 5 Here>
AIM Control Group
In untabulated tests, I use firms listed on the London Stock Exchange that are not subject
to the revised auditor and audit committee report requirements as an alternate control group (i.e.,
non-Premium equity companies). These firms are listed on the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM), which is a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange. I gather data from Datastream and
hand collect annual report dates from Bloomberg, which results in a balanced sample of 100
AIM companies.38 The AIM is designed for smaller, growing companies and thus consists of
firms that are significantly different than the more established Premium equity companies.39
Given these significant differences, I generate a propensity score matched sample of
Premium and AIM firms. The propensity score matched sample consists of 168 firm-year
observations (42 Premium and 42 AIM firms). Using this significantly reduced sample, I
estimate equations (1) and (2) adding an indicator variable to denote Premium listing companies

37

I employ a caliper of 3 percent within the matching process to ensure a reasonable level of matching. In addition,
the matching process is performed without replacement – thus no observations are duplicated in the matched sample.
It is important to note that untabulated tests confirm that there are no significant differences in the control variables
of the U.K. and U.S. firms in the matched sample.
38
Given the nature of firms listed on the AIM, the availability of data is limited for these companies, especially after
imposing the balanced panel requirement.
39
In untabulated tests, I confirm these differences and find that all control variables from equations (1) and (2) are
significantly different between the AIM and Premium firms at the p<0.01 level except for DISP.
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(PREMIUM) as well as interaction of PREMIUM and POST. In untabulated tests, I find that the
coefficient on POST x PREMIUM is positive and significant (p=0.08) in equation (1) and
negative and approaching significance (p=0.11) in equation (2). This analysis provides some
additional comfort that U.K. specific events (other than the new audit committee and auditor
disclosures) are not confounding the results of the study.
Change Analysis
To account for temporal changes within firms that are not associated with the revised
reporting standards, I re-run the above tests using a strict change analysis. Specifically, I
compare changes in the dependent variables from t-2 to t-1 with changes in these variables from
t-1 to t (as in the above analyses, t represents the year the new reporting regime is implemented).
I replace POST with CHG_POST, which equals one for observations associated with changes
from year t-1 to year t. All other variables in the models, including the respective dependent
variables, are also transformed to change variables. Table 6 presents the results of this analysis.40
Columns 1 and 2 reveal that CHG_POST is associated with a highly significant increase in
abnormal trading volume (p<0.01) and a significant decrease in abnormal bid-ask spreads
(p<0.05), respectively. These results further support a reduction in information asymmetry after
the revision of the auditor and audit committee report requirements. In addition, the examination
provides comfort that the documented findings are not driven by other factors that change year to
year for firms.
<Insert Table 6 Here>
Management Disclosure Analysis
Finally, to alleviate concerns that the results are driven by changes in management
40

Note that the additional data requirements for t-2 result in the loss of 132 firm-year observations.
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disclosure practices, I perform two additional analyses described below.
Strategic Reports Review
While several measures are employed to mitigate the concern of confounding events (i.e.
balanced panel design, control groups, and change analysis), it still may be possible that other
changes occurring over the same timeframe that only apply to U.K. Premium listed companies
could impact the results. The only such change that I am aware of is the requirement to replace
the business review section of the annual report with a strategic report that includes information
on the company’s strategy, business model, human rights, and gender diversity of its employees
and directors (Deloitte 2013). While the requirement went into effect for fiscal years ending on
or after September 30, 2013, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code has recommended this
reporting model on a ‘comply or explain’ basis since 2010 (Deloitte 2013). Furthermore, as
KPMG Partner Tim Copnell states, “The requirement for a Strategic Report…is essentially the
same as the Business Review it replaces...It is not clear how much a change in requirements this
represents” (Copnell 2013). I randomly selected 40 Premium firms and compared the company’s
strategic report in the current year’s annual report to its business review in the prior year’s annual
report. Each report contained the same primary disclosures. As I did not note any exceptions, this
review supports the commonly held sentiment that the strategic reports did not materially change
management’s disclosures and therefore this regulatory change is unlikely to impact my analysis.
Earnings Announcement Analysis
I also perform a falsification test by estimating models (1) and (2) around the earnings
announcement dates for the sample firms. Since the audit committee and auditor reports are not
released to the market until the annual report is issued and the reporting requirements for
earnings announcements did not change during this time period, I do not expect to find a
reduction in information asymmetry surrounding the earnings announcements of the sample
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firms. In support of this prediction, I fail to find evidence that abnormal trading volume and
abnormal bid-ask spreads significantly changed from the pre-period to the post-period.41 This
analysis provides additional comfort that the main findings of this study are not due to changes in
management disclosure practices or overall changes in the dependent variables over time for the
sample firms.

41

While I did not expect to find changes in the abnormal trading volume and bid-ask spreads around the earnings
announcement dates from the prior year to the first year of implementation of the reporting requirements, it is
possible that the new audit committee and auditor report requirements could impact management’s disclosure
practices around earnings releases over time. Future research could examine whether the information contained in
earnings announcements change over time as a result of the auditor and audit committee reporting changes.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While substantial revisions to audit committee and auditor reporting are being discussed
worldwide, archival research has been unable to examine the impact of these reforms. I exploit
the United Kingdom’s recent regulatory changes to fill this void. Using a balanced sample of
U.K. firms required to comply with the reporting revisions, I find that additional audit committee
and auditor disclosures are associated with a significant reduction in information asymmetry as
proxied by higher abnormal trading volume and lower abnormal bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, I
find greater reductions in information asymmetry for firms with weaker information
environments, suggesting that the new disclosures particularly benefit investors in these firms. I
also find some evidence that companies employing auditors that tend to provide more (less)
detailed audit reports experience more (less) significant reductions in information asymmetry. In
addition, the results are robust to the use of control samples, a strict change analysis, and a
falsification test using earnings announcement dates.
By examining the impact of the U.K.’s new audit committee and auditor reports, this
study provides important information for public companies, audit firms, audit committees,
investors, regulators, other financial statement users, and the overall capital markets. The results
reveal that additional required auditor and audit committee disclosures can provide investors
with useful information that impacts their trading decisions. My analysis not only reveals the
effects of these regulatory changes in the United Kingdom, but also presents considerations for
the evaluation of the standards proposed by regulators of other major capital markets
internationally, particularly the PCAOB and the SEC.
In conclusion, I outline the following limitations and opportunities for future research.
This study provides relevant and timely information to regulators, investors, professional groups,
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and other stakeholders by examining the first year of implementation of the audit committee and
audit reporting standards in the United Kingdom. Whether the documented effects persist in
future years is unknown and would be an important research question in its own right.
Additionally, while there are numerous regulatory and cultural commonalities between the
United Kingdom and the United States, there are three differences in these countries that may be
important to consider: (1) litigation tends to play a greater role in the development and
enforcement of regulations in the U.S. than in the U.K., (2) U.S. financial accounting standards
are ‘rules-based’ while the U.K.’s standards are ‘principles-based’, and (3) the U.K.’s FRC sets
auditing, governance, and accounting standards while several regulatory bodies are responsible
for setting these standards in the U.S., namely the PCAOB, SEC, and FASB. This last difference
between the countries presents an additional challenge to the United States as more than one
regulator would need to be involved to institute both audit committee and auditor reporting
changes. The results of this paper therefore need to be interpreted with these considerations in
mind and future research could illuminate the possible impact of these differences on audit
committee and audit report reforms. Notwithstanding the above, this research informs a highly
relevant regulatory debate on the effects of changing auditor and audit committee reports.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1: Sample Construction
Table 1 presents the sample selection process for the main analysis performed in this study. The final
sample is comprised of 291 firm observations or 582 firm-year observations.

Premium Equity Listings on London Stock Exchange
Less: Investment Funds
Premium Equity Commercial Companies
Less: Firms missing annual report dates in Bloomberg
Less: Firms missing data necessary to calculate AVOL and ASPREAD
Less: Firms missing data necessary to compute control variables
Final Sample (firm observations)
Final Sample (firm-year observations)
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Firm Observations
937
(428)
509
(101)
(82)
(35)
291
582

Table 2: Univariate Results
Table 2 presents the differences in means between the pre-period and post-period for each variable of
interest (AVOL and ASPREAD) as well as each control variable in equations (1) and (2). All variables
are defined in Appendix B. ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise).

POST=0
(N=291)
AVOL
ASPREAD
LN_MVE
NUM_ANALYST
LAG
DISP
LOSS
UE
SD_CFO

+
-

POST=1
(N=291)

-0.038
0.138
14.175
11.694
27.048
0.009
0.141
0.010
0.043

0.096
0.002
14.367
11.406
27.828
0.009
0.151
0.015
0.041
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Difference
0.133
-0.136
0.193
-0.289
0.780
0.000
0.010
0.005
-0.002

p-value
0.041
0.008
0.205
0.329
0.257
0.826
0.363
0.194
0.670

**
***

Table 3: Regression Results
Table 3 presents the regression results for the estimation of equation (1) in the first column and equation
(2) in the second column. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust p-values adjusted for firm
clustering effects are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. * and ** indicate significance at the
0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed
otherwise).

(1)
AVOL

VARIABLES
POST

+

LN_MVE

?

NUM_ANALYST

+

LAG

-

DISP

?

LOSS

-

UE

?

SD_CFO

?

Constant

?

0.128**
(0.045)
0.046
(0.243)
0.012*
(0.083)
-0.005**
(0.019)
-1.670
(0.465)
-0.059
(0.325)
0.904
(0.568)
-0.669
(0.349)
-1.015*
(0.074)

Industry Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
582
0.085

47

(2)
ASPREAD
?
+
?
+
?
?
?

-0.126**
(0.016)
-0.053**
(0.048)
-0.000
(0.494)
0.002
(0.297)
-2.835
(0.424)
0.064
(0.317)
0.276
(0.880)
0.927
(0.158)
0.309
(0.547)
Yes
582
0.094

Table 4: Analyst Following Analysis
Table 4 presents the analyst following analysis. Panels A and B present the regression results for the
estimation of equations (1) and (2), respectively. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the subsamples
of firms with high analyst coverage and low analyst coverage (divided at the median NUM_ANALYST).
Column 3 presents the regression results using the full sample of firms including an interaction of POST x
NUM_ANALYST. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust p-values adjusted for firm clustering
effects are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, twotailed otherwise).

Panel A: AVOL

VARIABLES
POST

+

LN_MVE

?

NUM_ANALYST

+

High Analyst
Coverage
(1)
AVOL

Low Analyst
Coverage
(2)
AVOL

-0.005
(0.935)
0.006
(0.893)
0.003
(0.364)

0.298**
(0.018)
0.093
(0.239)
-0.022
(0.610)

POST x NUM_ANALYST

?
?
?
-

LAG

-

DISP

?

LOSS

-

UE

?

SD_CFO

?

Constant

?

Industry Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Full
Sample
(3)
AVOL

-0.005**
(0.035)
-3.091*
(0.087)
-0.115
(0.153)
4.414***
(0.000)
-1.464***
(0.000)
0.351
(0.588)

-0.007*
(0.061)
-4.641*
(0.055)
0.026
(0.902)
-0.752
(0.691)
1.001
(0.668)
-0.700
(0.447)

Yes
303
0.108

Yes
279
0.138
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?
?
?
?

0.314*
(0.062)
0.048
(0.233)
0.020**
(0.049)
-0.016**
(0.045)
-0.005**
(0.040)
-1.564
(0.502)
-0.066
(0.608)
0.805
(0.616)
-0.649
(0.361)
-1.115*
(0.051)
Yes
582
0.090

Table 4 continued: Analyst Following Analysis

Panel B: ASPREAD

VARIABLES
POST

-

LN_MVE

?

NUM_ANALYST

-

High Analyst
Coverage
(1)
ASPREAD

Low Analyst
Coverage
(2)
ASPREAD

-0.026
(0.242)
-0.049*
(0.066)
0.007
(0.910)

-0.225**
(0.032)
-0.025
(0.616)
-0.043**
(0.045)

POST x NUM_ANALYST

?
?
?
+

LAG

+

DISP

?

LOSS

+

UE

?

SD_CFO

?

Constant

?

Industry Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Full
Sample
(3)
ASPREAD

0.001*
(0.089)
-7.863**
(0.033)
0.154*
(0.083)
-2.276
(0.452)
0.187
(0.287)
0.746*
(0.063)

0.002
(0.321)
0.738
(0.868)
0.039
(0.423)
1.653
(0.214)
2.158
(0.202)
0.798
(0.308)

Yes
303
0.382

Yes
279
0.165
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+
?
+
?
?
?

-0.257*
(0.065)
-0.054**
(0.044)
-0.005
(0.424)
0.011*
(0.063)
0.002
(0.300)
-2.910
(0.413)
0.069
(0.302)
0.346
(0.851)
0.913
(0.166)
0.380
(0.460)
Yes
582
0.098

Table 5: Regression Results using U.S. Control Group
Table 5 presents the regression results for the estimation of equations (1) and (2) using U.S. firms as a
control group. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for a full sample of U.S. and U.K. firms. Columns 3
and 4 present the analysis using a propensity score matched sample. All variables are defined in Appendix
B. Robust p-values adjusted for firm clustering effects are presented in parentheses below the coefficients.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed
tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise).

Full Sample
(1)
AVOL

VARIABLES
POST

?

UK

?

POST x UK

+

LN_MVE

?

NUM_ANALYST

+

LAG

-

DISP

?

LOSS

-

UE

?

SD_CFO

?

Constant

?

Industry Fixed Effects
Total Observations
UK Observations
US Observations
R-squared

0.038
(0.102)
-0.152**
(0.017)
0.103*
(0.090)
-0.008
(0.567)
0.004*
(0.065)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-1.956
(0.369)
0.007
(0.439)
0.884
(0.381)
-0.077
(0.863)
0.371
(0.165)

Propensity Matched Sample
(3)
(4)
AVOL
ASPREAD

(2)
ASPREAD
?
?
?
+
?
+
?
?
?

0.074*
(0.099)
0.001
(0.982)
-0.193***
(0.004)
-0.097***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.251)
0.005**
(0.012)
-2.501
(0.409)
-0.115*
(0.051)
0.017
(0.987)
0.310
(0.630)
1.445***
(0.000)

Yes
2,342
582
1,760
0.100

Yes
2,342
582
1,760
0.035
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?
?
+
?
+
?
?
?
?

0.046
(0.503)
-0.209**
(0.029)
0.296**
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.932)
0.013**
(0.028)
-0.001
(0.306)
9.778**
(0.045)
-0.107
(0.210)
-2.660**
(0.050)
-1.020
(0.208)
0.279
(0.581)
Yes
468
234
234
0.106

?
?
?
+
?
+
?
?
?

0.147
(0.320)
0.043
(0.597)
-0.299**
(0.044)
-0.068
(0.111)
0.002
(0.348)
0.001
(0.434)
3.079
(0.506)
-0.237
(0.905)
4.402**
(0.028)
0.347
(0.798)
0.936
(0.147)
Yes
468
234
234
0.073

Table 6: Change Analysis
Table 6 presents the results for the estimation of equations (1) and (2) using a strict change analysis.
CHG_POST equals one for observations associated with changes from year t-1 to year t (where t
represents the year the new reporting regime is implemented). All other variables, including the
dependent variables, are also transformed to yearly change variables. Robust p-values adjusted for firm
clustering effects are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ** and *** indicate significance at
the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed
otherwise).

(1)
CHG_AVOL

VARIABLES
CHG_POST

+

CHG_LN_MVE

?

CHG_NUM_ANALYST

+

CHG_LAG

-

CHG_DISP

?

CHG_LOSS

-

CHG_UE

?

CHG_SD_CFO

?

Constant

?

Industry Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

0.362***
(0.008)
-0.084
(0.694)
-0.005
(0.429)
-0.004
(0.146)
-7.337**
(0.020)
-0.085
(0.323)
2.279
(0.139)
-0.838
(0.601)
-0.237
(0.534)
Yes
450
0.052

51

(2)
CHG_ASPREAD
?
+
?
+
?
?
?

-0.225**
(0.030)
0.159
(0.396)
-0.005
(0.404)
-0.000
(0.470)
5.682
(0.531)
0.012
(0.477)
-1.905
(0.625)
-1.446
(0.418)
0.078
(0.880)
Yes
450
0.060

Appendix B: Variable Descriptions
Main analysis dependent and test variables
AVOL

ASPREAD
POST

The natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s mean eventperiod volume to the firm’s average estimation-period volume
(DeFond et al. 2007; Landsman et al. 2012). Daily trading
volume obtained from Datastream.
The firm’s mean event-period spread minus the firm’s average
estimation-period spread (Blankespoor et al. 2014; Bushee et
al. 2010). Daily bid and ask prices obtained from Datastream.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fiscal year is the first year
of the new reporting regime, 0 otherwise.

Main analysis control variables
DISP
IND_FE
LAG

LN_MVE
LOSS
NUM_ANALYST
SD_CFO

UE

The standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled
by stock price. Analyst forecast data obtained from I/B/E/S on
Datastream.
Industry fixed effects based on two-digit industry codes.
Obtained from Datastream.
The number of calendar days between the earnings
announcement date and the annual report release date.
Earnings announcement dates obtained from I/B/E/S on
Datastream. Annual report dates hand collected from
Bloomberg.
The natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured
at end of year t. Obtained from Datastream.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s reported
earnings per share is less than 0, 0 otherwise. Obtained from
Datastream.
The number of analysts that follow a firm during the year of
the earnings announcement. Obtained from I/B/E/S on
Datastream.
Standard deviation of a firm’s cash flow from operations over
the prior five years, where cash flow from operations is scaled
by total assets at the end of each year. Data obtained from
Datastream.
The absolute value of the difference between actual earnings
per share and the most recent mean analyst estimate of
earnings prior to the earnings release, scaled by the closing
price at the end of year t. Data obtained from I/B/E/S on
Datastream.
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